



# An efficient online histogram publication method for data streams with local differential privacy\*

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**Abstract:** Many areas are now experiencing data streams that contain privacy-sensitive information. Although the sharing and release of these data are of great commercial value, if these data are released directly, the private user information in the data will be disclosed. Therefore, how to continuously generate publishable histograms (meeting privacy protection requirements) based on sliding data stream windows has become a critical issue, especially when sending data to an untrusted third party. Existing histogram publication methods are unsatisfactory in terms of time and storage costs, because they must cache all elements in the current sliding window (SW). Our work addresses this drawback by designing an efficient online histogram publication (EOHP) method for local differential privacy data streams. Specifically, in the EOHP method, the data collector first crafts a histogram of the current SW using an approximate counting method. Second, the data collector reduces the privacy budget by using the optimized budget absorption mechanism and adds appropriate noise to the approximate histogram, making it possible to publish the histogram while retaining satisfactory data utility. Extensive experimental results on two different real datasets show that the EOHP algorithm significantly reduces the time and storage costs and improves data utility compared to other existing algorithms.

**Key words:** Data stream; Differential privacy; Sliding windows; Approximate counting

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## 1 Introduction

With the rapid development of the Internet and big data technologies (Dwork, 2008), real-time data streams frequently appear in many application do-

main. For example, many large hospitals must release a daily update on the current infection rate of a certain contiguous disease in a contiguous area, so the government and local residents can respond in an appropriate and timely manner. In another example, a search engine might have to share information related to recent user interest trends with manufacturing companies to help them design new products or develop precise sales plan (Liu H et al., 2022). Of course, all these kinds of data grow quickly and continuously (Sultani and Ghani, 2015; Liu Z et al., 2020). It is very meaningful for us to understand such a data stream better with the aim of extracting

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critical demographic information and trend information (Wang XJ et al., 2023). At the same time, the data contains private personal information. If this information is released directly without protection, private personal information leakage can occur. Thus, how to rapidly extract critical cluster information from real-time data streams without compromising individual privacy is a fundamental challenge in the privacy protection research.

### 1.1 Background for privacy protection in data streams

Currently, there are roughly three approaches to protecting data privacy: anonymization (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008), encryption (Dwork and Roth, 2014), and differential privacy (DP) (Dwork and Roth, 2014; Wang S et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2018; Liu Z et al., 2021). Among them, DP defines a very strict attack model and has a rigorous mathematical theory proof that can support quantitative analysis of the background knowledge possessed by attackers. With DP, an appropriate amount of noise can be added to the data to prevent an attacker from obtaining private information, regardless of the amount of background knowledge that the attacker possesses. Therefore, DP has become a hot research topic in data privacy protection. DP can be further divided into two categories: centralized differential privacy (CDP) and local differential privacy (LDP) (Dwork, 2008). CDP requires a trusted third party, which may not be available in practical applications. In reality, such a trusted third party may seem to be reliable, but will actually, without hesitation, leak all such data to others for profit (Dwork, 2008; Dwork et al., 2010; Wang Q et al., 2018; Labs and Terry, 2020).

Compared to CDP (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008; Duchi et al., 2013; Dwork and Roth, 2014), LDP (Cormode et al., 2018; Errounda and Liu, 2018; Erlingsson et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2022) has the advantage of protecting massive end-user privacy data locally without directly relying on a trusted third party. Specifically, with LDP, the user sends perturbed data, rather than the original data, to the third party, so the third party does not represent a functional part of the process. Hence, the original data are retained by the user, which is certainly a better user privacy protection. Therefore, LDP has been successfully deployed by many well-known

corporations; for example, Google (Cormode et al., 2018) uses the RAPPOR version of LDP in Chrome to collect information about users' preferred homepages, and Apple (Cormode et al., 2018; Thakurta et al., 2018) has implemented LDP in recent iOS and Mac OS versions to collect information about user search records.

### 1.2 Prior arts and limitations

So far, LDP research has focused on data perturbation and data publication. For data perturbation, existing works usually rely on random response mechanisms (Erlingsson et al., 2014), which also serve as a foundation for other related perturbed methods. According to the types of data to be processed, the data publication methods are divided into two categories. The first category contains the methods that are used to handle discrete data, and aims to estimate data frequencies (i.e., the number of occurrences of each possible data value) (Erlingsson et al., 2014; Kairouz et al., 2014). The second category includes a method for continuous data, and attempts to estimate the mathematical means of intervals of interest (Nguyễn et al., 2016; Ye et al., 2019).

To the best of our knowledge, references (Fan and Xiong, 2013; Nguyễn et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2018; Ren et al., 2022) are the only research works that deal with publishing histograms based on sliding windows (SWs) in a data stream. For example, Yang et al. (2018) focused on discrete data and studied how to publish histograms by adding appropriate noise. Specifically, they adopted the budget absorption (BA) mechanism to dynamically allocate part of the privacy budget to each element in a data stream, in an effort to construct a publishable histogram at each time instance. Fan and Xiong (2013) proposed a framework called FAST for data publication in data streams. In the FAST framework, they developed a sampling component to reduce the original data stream to a subset of sampled elements, from which a publishable histogram could always be constructed. Then they designed a filtering component to determine when to update the sampled elements. Errounda and Liu (2018) studied how to combine w-event privacy and LDP, and proposed a continuous location statistics sharing algorithm with LDP. The proposed algorithm first computes the similarity between two consecutive windows, and perturbs this result using the random response method (Erlingsson

et al., 2014). Finally, it generates a histogram by adding additional noise. Ren et al. (2022) proposed a privacy budget partitioning framework, LDP-IDS, for histogram publication in real-time data streams. Specifically, in the LDP-IDS framework, they tried to divide the privacy budget based on how a data stream varies within a period. This method is able to boost data utility, while leading to a better allocation of the privacy budget.

However, these existing methods typically require buffering all elements contained in each SW (at each time instance), which inevitably leads to a heavy burden on time and storage costs. Furthermore, they usually need to exhaustively process every element within each window when constructing a publishable histogram, which causes a prohibitive computational burden. Note that time and storage costs are fundamental measurements of algorithms, especially for online algorithms in real-time data streams where massive data arrive continuously at a very high speed (Qin et al., 2016; Wang Q et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2019).

Lee et al. (2023) proposed a pioneering study that successfully implemented DP barriers for virtual emotion detection in the maritime transportation system. They ingeniously used mobile robots and drones to maximize the number of privacy barriers, thereby enhancing the system security. Kim et al. (2020) proposed a groundbreaking system named 5G-I-VEmoSYS, which integrates artificial intelligence and the fifth-generation mobile communication (5G) technology to enable virtual emotion detection in maritime transportation systems. Joy et al. (2023) introduced a smart security patrol robot based on Raspberry Pi that can use sound sensors and night vision cameras to monitor and protect a designated area. The robot can patrol a preset path, and if it detects any abnormal sound or face, it will send real-time video and location information to the user, so the user can take action in a timely manner. Because we use LDP to protect the data in our work, we can resist attacks based on background knowledge and prevent third-party leakage of user privacy. Therefore, the methods discussed are not suitable for application in our work and are not compared.

### 1.3 Proposed solution and main contributions

To address the above challenges, we propose the efficient online histogram publication (EOHP) algo-

rithm for LDP data streams, and combine the approximate counting methods with LDP. Our goal is to achieve online histogram publication, while avoiding disclosure of private user data by an untrusted third party due to device failure or profit seeking. Specifically, the proposed algorithm consists of three key steps as follows:

First, all users locally perturb their own data and then send the perturbed data to the collector. Consequently, we can prevent an untrusted third party from performing other related activities that compromise user privacy. Second, the data collector adaptively uses the approximate counting method (Datar et al., 2002) to quickly generate estimated histograms for each SW at each time instance. Therefore, we can avoid the heavy storage costs of caching each SW, and provide a well-estimated histogram with a guaranteed error bound, which can be further used in the next step to generate a publishable histogram. Third, we design an optimized budget absorption (OBA) mechanism that adds appropriate noise based on the error bound, to meet DP protection requirements. This step allows privacy allocation to proceed at a steady rate and also avoids excessive consumption of the privacy budget.

### 1.4 Summary of experimental results

We extensively compare the real performance of our algorithm (EOHP) with that of other three state-of-the-art algorithms, DDHP (Yang et al., 2018), k-means-dp (Zhang et al., 2014), and CLSA-LDP (Errounda and Liu, 2018) for histogram publication in data streams. In this subsection, we summarize the algorithms' performance based on typical real-world datasets (UK Car Accident Dataset and New York Taxi Dataset) to show the superiority of our algorithm.

1. Time cost. Using the same privacy budget, the average time cost of the EOHP algorithm for processing the UK Car Accident Dataset is about  $0.54 \times 10^5$  ms, while the other algorithms require at least  $2.18 \times 10^5$  ms. Thus, it can be concluded that the time cost of the EOHP algorithm is one quarter of that of the other algorithms. This experimental improvement verifies the theoretical analysis we presented in Section 4.2.4.

2. Storage cost. With the same privacy budget, the average storage cost of the EOHP algorithm based on the New York Taxi Dataset is

approximately  $2.85 \times 10^5$  bits, while the other algorithms require at least  $5.13 \times 10^5$  bits. Therefore, the EOHP algorithm outperforms the others by reducing the storage cost by a factor of about  $\frac{11}{25}$ . This experimental result also verifies the theoretical characteristics of the EOHP algorithm as shown in Section 4.2.5.

3. Data utility. We use the mean squared error (MSE) to measure the data utility of the four algorithms. Using the same privacy budget, the MSE of the EOHP algorithm is only about 33.5% of that of the other algorithms based on the two datasets on average. Specifically, for the UK Car Accident Dataset, the MSE of the EOHP algorithm is about 39.0% of the maximum availability of the other three algorithms; for the New York Taxi Dataset, the MSE of the EOHP algorithm is about 28.0% of that of the CLSA-LDP algorithm. This improvement is further supported by the theoretical analysis in Section 3.5.

In summary, using identical privacy budgets, the proposed EOHP algorithm can not only reduce the time and storage costs significantly, but also achieve much better data utility.

## 2 Preliminaries

In this section, we first present the definitions of DP, data streams, and SWs, which are all foundations of our work. We list all the frequently used symbols in Table 1.

**Table 1** Definition of symbols

| Symbol        | Description                                                                                            |
|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| $H$           | A data stream, i.e., a constant sequence of data elements: $H = \{H_1, H_2, \dots, H_N\}$              |
| $N$           | Number of data elements in the dataset                                                                 |
| $w$           | Sliding window size                                                                                    |
| $H_{w_i}$     | The sliding window at time instance $i$ , $H_{w_i} = \{H_i, H_{i+1}, \dots, H_{i+w-1}\}, i \in [1, N]$ |
| $\bar{H}_i$   | Approximate histogram at time instance $i$                                                             |
| $\tilde{H}_i$ | Histogram of additive noise at time instance $i$                                                       |
| $L$           | Number of statistical intervals                                                                        |
| $r$           | Number of buckets (a data structure) used by the EOHP algorithm                                        |
| $\epsilon$    | Privacy budget                                                                                         |

### 2.1 Sliding window model

An SW (Errounda and Liu, 2018) in a data stream is a fixed-size interval over a constant stream of data that generates a fixed-size window at each

passing time instance, and each window generates a histogram. New data arrive and old data expire, constantly updating and publishing histograms that satisfy DP in real time. Fig. 1 shows the process of publishing a satisfactory DP histogram of data streams when using the SW model.




**Fig. 1** Histogram publishing process using the sliding window model

For the convenience of discussion, the parameters involved in this paper are defined as follows:

A real-time data stream is denoted by  $H$ :

$$H = \{H_1, H_2, \dots, H_N\}. \quad (1)$$

There are  $d$  attributes of user  $i$ :

$$x(i) = \{x_1(i), x_2(i), \dots, x_d(i)\}, i \in [1, N]. \quad (2)$$

Data in the SW at time instance  $i$  are represented by

$$H_{w_i} = \{H_i, H_{i+1}, \dots, H_{i+w-1}\}, i \in [1, N]. \quad (3)$$

Preliminary histogram obtained by the approximate counting algorithm at time instance  $i$  is denoted by

$$\bar{H} = \{\bar{H}_1, \bar{H}_2, \dots, \bar{H}_N\}. \quad (4)$$

The histogram protected by the EOHP algorithm at time instance  $i$  is represented as

$$\tilde{H} = \{\tilde{H}_1, \tilde{H}_2, \dots, \tilde{H}_N\}. \quad (5)$$

### 2.2 Differential privacy

DP is a strong privacy protection technique based on the strict mathematical theory. Specifically, DP can quantitatively analyze the attacker's background knowledge; even if an attacker has all the data information except the target data, after DP protection, the attacker cannot obtain the precise target data. The research directions of DP

techniques include CDP (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008; Duchi et al., 2013; Dwork and Roth, 2014) and LDP (Cormode et al., 2018; Errounda and Liu, 2018; Erlingsson et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2022); despite their different data processing methods, both can achieve very high data utility. The two mechanisms are described below.

### 2.2.1 CDP

In CDP, users send their real data to the data collector on demand; then, the collector publishes histograms that meet DP protection requirements. CDP not only processes data in real time to extract valuable information for distribution, but also protects user privacy. By adding a very small amount of noise to the data, a very high level of data utility can be achieved. However, CDP has a drawback: the third-party collector must be credible, and otherwise, private data are still at the risk of being leaked by untrusted third parties. The definitions of CDP applied to data streams are as follows:

**Definition 1** ( $\epsilon$ -DP) A non-interactive privacy algorithm  $A$  gives  $\epsilon$ -DP if, for any datasets  $H$  and  $H'$  that differ on at most one coding, and for any possible anonymized dataset  $y \in \text{range}(A)$  that satisfies inequality (6):

$$\frac{\Pr(A(H) = y)}{\Pr(A(H') = y)} \leq e^\epsilon, \quad (6)$$

the smaller the  $\epsilon$  value, the closer the probabilities of  $A(H) = y$  and  $A(H') = y$  output results, which indicates that algorithm  $A$  has stronger data privacy protection strength.

**Definition 2** (Global sensitivity) For any function  $f$ ,  $H \in \mathbb{R}^d$  ( $d$  is the query scope), the global sensitivity of function  $f$  is

$$\Delta f = \max_{\{H, H'\}} \{||f(H) - f(H')||\}, \quad (7)$$

where  $H$  and  $H'$  are adjacent datasets.

### 2.2.2 LDP

LDP differs from CDP because it can not only defend against the maximum background knowledge attacks, but also avoid privacy attacks from untrusted third parties. In LDP, users first perturb their real data through the mechanism  $M$ , and then send  $M(x)$  obtained from the perturbation process to the collector who statistically analyzes and releases it.

**Definition 3** (LDP) Given a perturbation mechanism  $M$ , a definition domain  $\text{Dom}(M)$ , and a value domain  $\text{Range}(M)$ , the mechanism  $M$  satisfies  $\epsilon$ -LDP if, given any input pair  $x$  and  $x'$  both of which satisfy the definition domain  $\text{Dom}(M)$ , the output  $y \in \text{range}(M)$  after algorithmic perturbation satisfies inequality (8):

$$\frac{\Pr(M(x) = y)}{\Pr(M(x') = y)} \leq e^\epsilon. \quad (8)$$

The  $\epsilon$  (privacy budget) value is inversely proportional to the degree of privacy protection and positively proportional to data utility. The smaller the  $\epsilon$  value, the better the privacy protection of the data and the worse the data utility. Therefore, because the attacker cannot determine what the input result is based on the output, further strong protection of data privacy is obtained. There are two important combinatorial properties in LDP: sequence combinability and parallel combinability.

1. Sequence combinability. Given a data stream  $H = \{H_1, H_2, \dots, H_N\}$  and  $m$  privacy algorithms  $A = \{A_1, A_2, \dots, A_m\}$ , the privacy parameters corresponding to the algorithms in privacy algorithm  $A$  are  $\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \dots, \epsilon_m$ . When these algorithms are applied to dataset  $H$ , they form a combination of  $A_1(H), A_2(H), \dots, A_m(H)$  and provide  $\sum_{i=1}^m \epsilon_i$ -DP.

2. Parallel combinability. Given a data stream  $H = \{H_1, H_2, \dots, H_N\}$ , assuming that each subset of the dataset is independent of all others, there are  $n$  privacy algorithms  $A = \{A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n\}$ , and the corresponding privacy parameters of the algorithms in  $A$  are  $\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \dots, \epsilon_n$ . When these algorithms operate simultaneously on the independent set  $H$ , they form a combination of  $A_1(H), A_2(H), \dots, A_n(H)$  and provide  $\max(\epsilon_i)$ -DP.

## 2.3 Noise addition mechanism

This subsection focuses on the CDP and LDP mechanisms for adding noise to real-time data streams.

### 2.3.1 CDP noise addition mechanism

The Laplacian mechanism protects user privacy information by adding Laplacian-distributed random noise to real data; the perturbed data are then sent to the data collector.

**Theorem 1** (Laplace mechanism) For any function  $f$ ,  $H \in \mathbb{R}^d$ , if the output of algorithm  $A$  satisfies

Eq. (9), then  $A$  satisfies  $\varepsilon$ -DP.

$$A(H) = f(H) + \left\langle \text{Lap}_1\left(\frac{\Delta f}{\varepsilon}\right), \text{Lap}_2\left(\frac{\Delta f}{\varepsilon}\right), \dots, \text{Lap}_d\left(\frac{\Delta f}{\varepsilon}\right) \right\rangle, \quad (9)$$

where  $\text{Lap}\left(\frac{\Delta f}{\varepsilon}\right)$  is a separate Laplace function. The scale parameter  $b$  ( $b > 0$ ) can be used to measure the added amount of noise. Generally, let  $b = \Delta f/\varepsilon$ ; the larger the  $b$ , the smaller the  $\varepsilon$ , indicating that the data privacy protection strength is better; when  $b$  is too large, the noise will cause poor data utility. Therefore, the algorithm needs a suitable  $\varepsilon$  value to achieve a balance between data protection and data utility.

### 2.3.2 LDP noise addition mechanism

Currently, the random response technique (Erlingsson et al., 2014) is the dominant perturbation mechanism in LDP. Random response is a foundation perturbation process on the user side of the data; the data received by the data collector are the perturbed data, so the risk of privacy leakage from an untrusted third party is avoided.

**Theorem 2** (Random response) For any input  $B \in X$ , if the response output of  $B' \in X$  satisfies Eq. (10), then the random response method satisfies  $\varepsilon$ -DP.

$$P(B' | B) = \frac{1}{k-1+e^\varepsilon} \begin{cases} e^\varepsilon, & \text{if } B' = B, \\ 1, & \text{if } B' \neq B. \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

For a case where the variable contains  $k$  ( $k > 2$ ) candidate values, users provide their own true data with probability  $\frac{e^\varepsilon}{k-1+e^\varepsilon}$  and randomly provide any one of the  $k-1$  pieces of false data with probability  $\frac{1}{k-1+e^\varepsilon}$ . Compared with the Laplace mechanism, random response not only ensures that the data are scrambled before they exit the mobile device, but also reduces the addition of noise at a later stage, making it more capable of meeting the strength requirement of data privacy protection.

## 3 EOHP method

In this section, we propose an EOHP algorithm that can process LDP data streams online while satisfying different privacy strength requirements.

### 3.1 Problem description

Given a data stream  $H = \{H_1, H_2, \dots, H_N\}$ , for  $H_i$  at time instant  $i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq N$ ), release a noisy version  $\tilde{H}$  in real time such that  $\tilde{H} = \{\tilde{H}_1, \tilde{H}_2, \dots, \tilde{H}_N\}$  satisfies  $\varepsilon$ -DP.

### 3.2 EOHP algorithm

Data protection for a given data stream  $H$  consists of three main steps: perturbation processing, approximation processing, and noise addition processing. First, users adopt the random response method to perturb their own data on the local side and then send them to the data collector. Second, the collector uses an approximate counting algorithm to quickly obtain an approximate histogram online at the current SW (note that  $i$  is the current time instance). Finally, to improve publishing efficiency, the data collector can decide whether to publish the histogram at the current SW based on the similarity result. When the data in the current window differ significantly from those in the previous window, we choose to publish the histogram in the current window by adding a small amount of noise to the data; otherwise, the data collector publishes a histogram with noise at the previous SW.

The specific process is shown in Algorithm 1. Note that in the following description, a bucket is the combination of two counters that record the number of 1's in a binary data stream and its timestamp.

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#### Algorithm 1 EOHP algorithm

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**Input:**  $H_i, T_0, \varepsilon$

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```

1: Obtain local side disturbance data  $\ddot{H}_i$ 
2: for each user do
3:   Send its own real data to the data collector with probability  $P$  in Eq. (10)
4: end for
5: Obtain preliminary histogram  $\bar{H}_i$ 
    $\bar{H}_i \rightarrow$  Approximate counting algorithm( $\ddot{H}_i$ )
6: if  $T > T_0$  then
7:    $\varepsilon_i \rightarrow \text{OBA}(\varepsilon)$ 
8:   Add Laplace noise  $\tilde{H}_i = \bar{H}_i + \text{Lap}(1/\varepsilon_i)$ 
9:    $\tilde{H}_i \rightarrow$  Dynamic programming grouping
10:   $\hat{H}_i = \tilde{H}_i$ 
11: else
12:   $\hat{H}_i = \tilde{H}_{i-1}$ 
13: end if
14: return  $\hat{H}_i$ 

```

---

Let us explain Algorithm 1. Note that we use  $\ddot{H}_i$  to represent the data perturbed on the local side and  $\bar{H}_i$  to represent the preliminary histogram of

the current time instance  $i$ . Furthermore, we use  $\tilde{H}_{i-1}$  to denote the histogram with noise at the time instance  $i-1$  and  $T_0$  to denote the threshold (the initial value of the threshold is determined by pre-sampling). With these notations in mind, we explain Algorithm 1 as follows: Lines 1–4 obtain the local side perturbed data ( $\tilde{H}_i$ ), so we can perfectly avoid privacy attacks from any untrusted third party. Line 5 obtains the approximate histogram within the current SW ( $H_{w_i}$  is the SW at time instance  $i$ ). With this step, we can rapidly obtain an approximate histogram  $\tilde{H}_i$  for each SW. In lines 6–13, we first compute the similarity between the current SW and the previous one. If this computed value exceeds the predefined threshold, we publish a new histogram by adding suitable noise to the generated approximate histogram  $\tilde{H}_i$  in lines 6–10. Conversely, if the similarity value does not surpass the threshold, we republish the previous histogram from the time instance  $i-1$  in lines 11–13. In addition, if we decide to publish a new histogram, we use the dynamic grouping method to reduce the MSE, thus boosting the data utility.

### 3.3 Approximate counting algorithm

In this phase, to quickly obtain the statistical value of each interval in SW at the current time instance, the data collector uses the approximate counting algorithm to initially process the perturbed data, because this process only needs to cache the data in the current SW. This saves time and space costs significantly, and can improve the overall performance of the EOHP algorithm. The algorithm process is shown as Algorithm 2.

Let us explain Algorithm 2. Note that we use  $B = [ ]$  to represent the buckets, and use “max” to represent the maximum number of buckets. Furthermore,  $t$  denotes the current time instance  $i$ , “sum” denotes the number of 1’s in a binary data stream, and “time” denotes the timestamp for a bucket. With these notations in mind, we can explain Algorithm 2 as follows: Lines 1–3 determine whether there is an expired bucket in the current window; if so, the bucket is deleted. Line 4 reads the file and creates a bucket, while setting the end timestamp equal to the current time. In lines 5–14, we first update the bucket in the SW; if there are max buckets of the same size, the two oldest buckets are merged at the current SW and the expired bucket is deleted. In

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#### Algorithm 2 Approximate counting algorithm

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```

1: if len( $B$ ) > 0 and  $t - w == B[0][\text{time}]$  then
2:   del  $B[0]$ 
3: end if
4: bit =  $f.\text{readline}()$ 
5: if bit == 1/ $n$  then
6:    $B = \{\text{time} : i + 1, \text{sum} : 1\}$ 
7:   for  $i = \text{len}(B) - 1$  to max - 1 do
8:     if  $B[i][\text{sum}] == B[i - \text{max}][\text{sum}]$  then
9:        $B[i - \text{max}][\text{sum}] += B[i - \text{max} + 1][\text{sum}]$ 
10:       $B[i - \text{max}][\text{time}] = B[i - \text{max}][\text{sum}]$ 
11:      del  $B[i - \text{max} + 1]$ 
12:     end if
13:   end for
14: end if
15: if len( $B$ ) > 0 then
16:   for  $i = 0$  to len( $B$ ) do
17:     sum + =  $B[i][\text{sum}]$ 
18:     sum - =  $B[0][\text{sum}]/2$ 
19:   end for
20: end if
21: return sum

```

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lines 15–20, the approximate value of each interval in the current window at the current time instance  $i$  is obtained. In addition, the time is divided into nine intervals, and a total of nine runs are performed to obtain the approximate histogram  $\tilde{H}_i$  at the current time.

Because Algorithm 2 is an approximate counting method in real-time data streams, there is a certain error between the final statistics and the true frequency number, and the following conclusions can be drawn according to Algorithm 2:

**Theorem 3** For  $H_i \in H$ , the approximate counting frequency satisfies  $|\tilde{H}_i - H_i| \leq \frac{1}{r-1} |H_i|$ .

**Proof** When the leftmost bucket has only one “1” in the query range, the query error result is the maximum. Specifically, we can obtain the real statistics of the data in the SW at the current time instance  $i$ :  $\tilde{H}_i = 1 + (r-1)(1 + 2 + \dots + 2^{j-2} + 2^{j-1}) = 1 + (r-1)(2^j - 1)$ , where  $2^j$  is the size of the bucket with the earliest timestamp and  $r$  is the preset number of buckets of the same size to be determined. At this time,  $2^{j-1} - 1$  is overestimated, and we can obtain  $|\tilde{H}_i - \tilde{H}_i| = 2^{j-1} - 1$ . Therefore, it can be proved that  $|\tilde{H}_i - \tilde{H}_i| \leq \frac{1}{r-1} |H_i|$ . In summary, to ensure that errors do not affect the accuracy of the final data release, the preset number of buckets of the same size should not exceed  $\frac{\tilde{H}_i}{|\tilde{H}_i - \tilde{H}_i|} + 1$ . Based on this, we can constantly adjust the preset number of buckets of the same size to optimize the final statistical results.

### 3.4 Privacy allocation policy

We propose an OBA mechanism for real-time data streams. In OBA, a privacy budget, denoted as  $\varepsilon_i$ , is assigned in advance to the data within the SW at each time instance, where  $\varepsilon_i = \frac{\varepsilon}{\text{len}(\text{data})-w+1}$ . If the correlation distance  $T$  between the SW data at adjacent moments is less than the threshold  $T_0$ , the previous moment's noise histogram  $\tilde{H}_{i-1}$  is published, its privacy budget  $\varepsilon_i$  is retained, and  $\varepsilon_i = \frac{\varepsilon-\varepsilon_i}{\text{len}(\text{data})-(i-1)-w+1}$  is used to publish the histogram with noise that meets the noise conditions at the next time instance. Otherwise,  $\varepsilon_i$  value for publishing the current time instance of histogram  $\tilde{H}_i$  is obtained, constantly updating  $\varepsilon_i$  for data noise processing at each time instance. This approach allows maximization of privacy budget saving upfront, thus addressing the problem of excessive consumption of privacy budgets. To visualize how OBA allocates a privacy budget, Fig. 2 shows the OBA privacy budget allocation mechanism process when the window size  $w = 3$ .

As seen in Fig. 2, the data must be noisy and published at the first time instance, and the privacy budget to be allocated is  $\varepsilon_1 = \frac{\varepsilon}{\text{len}(\text{data})-w+1}$ . However, the histogram in the window from time instance 2 to time instance  $i-1$  does not meet the conditions for adding noise, and the pre-allocated privacy budget will always be retained. At this time,




**Fig. 2** Privacy budget allocation process of optimized budget absorption

the histograms in the window meet the noise condition at time instance  $i$  and are allocated  $\varepsilon_i = \frac{\varepsilon-\varepsilon_1}{\text{len}(\text{data})-(i-1)-w+1}$ . If the histogram at a subsequent time continuously meets conditions for adding noise, the privacy budget value is allocated. Otherwise,  $\varepsilon_i = \frac{\varepsilon-\varepsilon_i}{\text{len}(\text{data})-i+w+1}$  is constantly updated to publish the histogram that satisfies the noise condition at the next time instance.

### 3.5 Algorithm performance analysis

To analyze the performance of the proposed EOHP algorithm, it is compared with DDHP (Yang et al., 2018), k-means-dp (Zhang et al., 2014), and CLSA-LDP (Errounda and Liu, 2018) algorithms. The DDHP algorithm directly adds noise to the accurate histogram, while adopting the BA privacy budget allocation strategy. The k-means-dp algorithm combines a MapReduce framework with  $k$ -means clustering to add noise to clustered data for publication. The CLSA-LDP algorithm adds noise to the accurate histogram with the random perturbation processing for publication. The results are shown in Table 2.

As can be seen from Table 2, with the same privacy budget, the MSE, time cost, and storage cost of the EOHP algorithm are all smaller than those of the other three algorithms. Specifically, for the time and storage costs, the other three algorithms need to cache  $w$  pieces of data in the whole window and then process them. Due to the time needed to process  $w$  pieces of data, the time cost is  $O(w)$ . The storage cost of  $w$  pieces of data is  $O(w \log_2 L)$ , because all data in the window are divided into  $L$  intervals, and  $w$  pieces of data need  $w \log_2 L$  bits. In contrast, the EOHP algorithm uses the approximate counting method to cache and process  $w$  pieces of data in the window online. The time and storage costs of this algorithm are  $O(L \log_2 w)$  and  $O(\frac{L}{r-1} \log_2 w)$ , respectively. The reason for this is that the approximate

**Table 2** Comparison of histogram publication algorithms

| Method     | Design idea                                                                                              | Time cost       | Storage cost                | Mean squared error (MSE)            |
|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| DDHP       | Adding noise to the exact histogram and publishing                                                       | $O(w)$          | $O(w \log_2 L)$             | $1.5 \times 10^5 - 3.5 \times 10^5$ |
| k-means-dp | Combining a MapReduce framework with $k$ -means clustering to add noise to clustered data for publishing | $O(w)$          | $O(w \log_2 L)$             | $1.2 \times 10^5 - 2.6 \times 10^5$ |
| CLSA-LDP   | Adding noise to the exact histogram with random perturbation processing for release                      | $O(w)$          | $O(w \log_2 L)$             | $0.8 \times 10^5 - 1.7 \times 10^5$ |
| EOHP       | Adaptive noise enhancement and publishing of the approximate histogram online after random combustion    | $O(L \log_2 w)$ | $O(\frac{L}{r-1} \log_2 w)$ | $0.6 \times 10^5 - 1.4 \times 10^5$ |

counting method transforms each data point into a binary representation and then performs the computation, so the time cost is  $L \log_2 w$ . In addition, the window needs to cache  $\log_2 w$  buckets, each bucket needs to use  $\log_2 w$  bits, and each binary bit is divided into  $L$  intervals, so the storage cost needs  $L \log_2 w$  bits. Furthermore, the statistical error value in the approximate counting method is  $\frac{1}{r-1}$  times the real value. Therefore, the total storage costs of the EOHP algorithm are  $\frac{L}{r-1} \log_2 w$  bits. For the MSE, compared to other algorithms, the EOHP algorithm adopts the dynamic planning grouping method to reduce the overall publication error, which can improve data utility. Therefore, the MSE of the EOHP algorithm is smaller than those of the other algorithms based on two datasets which will be detailed later.

## 4 Experiments

In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed EOHP algorithm and compare it with three recent algorithms for privacy protection in real-time data streams.

### 4.1 Experimental setting

All experiments in this study were conducted on a desktop computer running Windows 10 Pro, equipped with an Intel® Core™ i9-10980XE CPU operating at 3.0 GHz and 64 GB RAM, and the experimental codes were implemented in Python.

During the experiments, we used two real datasets: the UK Car Accident Dataset and the New York Taxi Dataset. Specifically, the UK Car Accident Dataset contains 1 048 576 traffic accident records, where the age range of the car accident is  $[0, 90]$  and the monthly revenue range is  $[2000, 20\,000]$ . The New York Taxi Dataset contains 1 640 597 passenger count records, where the passenger counting interval of all these records is  $[0, 6]$ .

The monthly income range of the UK Car Accident Dataset is from 2000 to 20 000, which is a relatively wide range. In the experiments, this range was used to compare the spatial complexity of different algorithms. The passenger range of the New York Taxi Dataset is from 0 to 6, which is a relatively narrow range, and the data are more concentrated. In the experiments, this range was used to compare the temporal complexity of different algorithms in a practical application setting and to observe the

change in data error as a result of changing the value of  $T_0$  (the maximum distance between SW data at adjacent instants).

We compare our EOHP algorithm with three algorithms for histogram publication: DDHP (Yang et al., 2018), k-means-dp (Zhang et al., 2014), and CLSA-LDP (Errounda and Liu, 2018) algorithms. These algorithms are either state-of-the-art solutions for dynamic data or recent algorithms for data streams. To make these algorithms more suitable for processing real-time data streams, three main improvements are made in our work: first, users obfuscate their personal data using the LDP algorithm before sending them to the data collector. Second, to obtain the approximate histogram of the current time instance, the collector adopts the approximate counting method to initially process the perturbed data. Finally, the OBA mechanism is used to allocate a reasonable privacy budget for noise processing of the histogram, which maximizes the privacy budget saving upfront and avoids excessive consumption of the privacy budget.

We use MSE (Dwork and Roth, 2014; Nguyễn et al., 2016; Ren et al., 2022) to test the utility of all algorithms and measure the availability of the EOHP algorithm, which is expressed as

$$\text{Err}(H_{w_i}) = E \left( \sum_{i \in [1, N]} (H_i - \tilde{H}_i)^2 \right), \quad (11)$$

where  $H_i$  is the true value of the data at the current time instance  $i$ , and  $\tilde{H}_i$  is the value obtained by the EOHP algorithm.

### 4.2 Experimental results

The data utility of the EOHP algorithm in terms of data publishing was measured based on two real-world datasets, different threshold  $T_0$  values, privacy budget  $\varepsilon$  values, and SW size  $w$  values, and was compared with DDHP, k-means-dp, and CLSA-LDP algorithms. The DDHP algorithm adds noise to the accurate histogram and adopts the BA mechanism to allocate reasonable privacy budget. The k-means-dp algorithm adopts a MapReduce framework while using  $k$ -means clustering in line point noise addition. The CLSA-LDP algorithm first perturbs the true differences in the accurate histogram at an adjacent moment SW, and then adds appropriate noise by using an adaptive privacy distribution mechanism.

#### 4.2.1 The impact of threshold $T_0$

In this group of experiments,  $w=200$ ,  $\varepsilon=1$ , and 10 000 records were selected from the New York Taxi Dataset. The purpose is to observe the change in the data error as a result of changing the value of  $T_0$  (the maximum distance between SW data at adjacent instants). The results are shown in Fig. 3.

Fig. 3 shows the relationship between  $T_0$  and the total error of the relevant distance.  $T_0$  is a parameter that controls the amount of noise added to the data to achieve DP. The total error is the sum of the noise error and the reconstruction error. The noise error is the difference between the original data and the noisy data. The reconstruction error is the difference between the noisy data and the reconstructed data. The optimal  $T_0$  depends on the characteristics of the data and the reconstruction algorithm. In our work, we first use the approximate technique algorithm to process the data online and obtain the preliminary histogram of each time interval. In the approximate technique algorithm, we try to find a preset number of same-sized buckets that should not be exceeded. We can continuously adjust the preset number of same-sized buckets to optimize the final statistical results, so the optimal  $T_0$  will vary according to the preset number of same-sized buckets. In addition, we use the dynamic programming grouping method to reconstruct the data. In the dynamic programming grouping method, we try to find the minimum data grouping error, so we can find the optimal grouping when the data reach the minimum error. We can see that the optimal  $T_0$  will vary according to the optimal grouping. Therefore, we find an optimal  $T_0$  that minimizes the total error of the

data by adjusting the preset number of same-sized buckets and finding the optimal grouping.

As seen in Fig. 3, as  $T_0$  increases, the overall error trend of the correlation distance decreases first and then increases. Therefore,  $T_0$  has an impact on the overall error, and the overall error is composed of the noise error and reconstruction error. When  $T_0$  is small, the overall error is determined mainly by the noise error, and when the noise error is larger, the overall error is greater. When  $T_0$  begins to increase, the overall error is determined mainly by the reconstruction error, and when the reconstruction error decreases, the overall error will also decrease. As  $T_0$  continues to increase, the noise error and the reconstruction error increase, and the overall error increases. As a result of the above analysis, in this experimental validation, we need to find an optimal  $T_0$  so that the overall error is relatively small. Therefore, the New York Taxi Dataset uses  $T_0$  of 0.05 and the UK Car Accident Dataset uses  $T_0$  of 0.04.

The highlights of our work include the following: using the approximate counting algorithm (Algorithm 2) to process data online saves a lot of time and space costs, and adopting the OBA mechanism allocates the privacy budget appropriately, while grouping methods to reduce the overall error and improve the overall data accuracy.

#### 4.2.2 The impact of privacy budget $\varepsilon$

In this group of experiments,  $w=200$ , different privacy budget  $\varepsilon$  values were used for the New York Taxi Dataset and the UK Car Accident Dataset, and the impact on data utility was observed by selecting different  $\varepsilon$  values. The experimental results are shown in Figs. 4 and 5.

In Figs. 4 and 5, the total errors of the EOHP, DDHP, k-means-dp, and CLSA-LDP algorithms all decrease as the  $\varepsilon$  value increases, which is consistent with inequality (6). It can clearly be seen that the MSEs of the DDHP, k-means-dp, and CLSA-LDP algorithms are all greater than that of the EOHP algorithm. The reason is that although the DDHP and CLSA-LDP algorithms use similarity measurement, they do not use the correlation method to reduce the error when the correlation distance is greater than the threshold, and directly add noise to the data at the current time instance. The k-means-dp algorithm causes a large data error due to the large distance between the noise-added new centroid and




Fig. 3 Mean squared error (MSE) analysis of threshold  $T_0$  on data utility based on the New York Taxi Dataset




Fig. 4 Mean squared error (MSE) analysis of privacy budget  $\epsilon$  on data utility based on the New York Taxi Dataset




Fig. 6 Mean squared error (MSE) analysis of window size  $w$  on data utility based on the New York Taxi Dataset




Fig. 5 Mean squared error (MSE) analysis of privacy budget  $\epsilon$  on data utility based on the UK Car Accident Dataset




Fig. 7 Mean squared error (MSE) analysis of window size  $w$  on data utility based on the UK Car Accident Dataset

the original centroid. In contrast, in EOHP, we use the dynamic planning grouping method to optimize histogram grouping, which attempts to reduce the global data release error. Therefore, the overall error of the EOHP algorithm is the lowest, and the data utility on both the New York Taxi Dataset and the UK Car Accident Dataset is highest.

#### 4.2.3 The impact of window size $w$

In this group of experiments,  $\epsilon=1$ , different  $w$  values were used for the New York Taxi Dataset and the UK Car Accident Dataset, and MSE gradually increases with the increase in  $w$ . The experimental results are shown in Figs. 6 and 7.

In Figs. 6 and 7, when  $w$  increases, the total errors of the EOHP, DDHP, k-means-dp, and CLSA-LDP algorithms increase. Larger  $w$  values cause increases in the approximate error and the noise error, which results in a greater total error. The EOHP algorithm's error growth rate is significantly lower

than those of the other three algorithms, as shown in the figures. This is a more concise and clearer way to display the main point of this information. The EOHP algorithm first uses the approximate statistical value in the place of noise to avoid the addition of too much noise in the SW. Then the dynamic planning grouping method is used to reduce the total publication error, so the increasing data error trend will be relatively flat, and the EOHP algorithm's average total error is reduced by 50%, compared to the other three algorithms.

#### 4.2.4 Experimental evaluation of the time cost

In this group of experiments,  $\epsilon=1$ ,  $L=6$ , and the EOHP algorithm is compared with other algorithms to observe the time cost using passenger counts from the UK Car Accident Dataset. The results are shown in Fig. 8.

From Fig. 8, it can be concluded that the runtime of the EOHP algorithm is less than that of the




Fig. 8 Time cost comparison among EOHP, DDHP, k-means-dp, and CLSA-LDP algorithms

other three algorithms, because the EOHP algorithm adopts Algorithm 2 (the approximate counting algorithm) to process the data stream online, and the processing dimension is an interval of data rather than a single data value. Therefore, the EOHP algorithm requires less runtime.

#### 4.2.5 Experimental evaluation of the storage cost

In this group of experiments,  $\epsilon=1$ ,  $L = 1000$ ,  $r = 10$ , and the EOHP algorithm is compared with other algorithms to observe the storage cost using the monthly revenue data from the New York Taxi Dataset. The results are shown in Fig. 9.

From Fig. 9, it can be concluded that the storage cost of the EOHP algorithm is less than that of the other algorithms, because the EOHP algorithm adopts Algorithm 2 (the approximate counting algorithm) to process the data flow online, and the processing dimension is an interval of data rather than a single data value. Therefore, the EOHP algorithm has a lower storage cost.

In summary, the above experimental results demonstrate that our proposed EOHP algorithm has lower time and storage costs and a smaller data publication error when compared with the existing state-of-the-art histogram publishing methods.

## 5 Conclusions

In this paper, we proposed an EOHP algorithm for LDP data streams. First, we used the random response method to obfuscate user data on the local side, which can avoid privacy attacks by an untrusted third party. Second, we used the approximate counting method to obtain the preliminary histograms at




Fig. 9 Storage cost comparison among EOHP, DDHP, k-means-dp, and CLSA-LDP algorithms

the current SW online, which saves time and storage costs significantly. Finally, to avoid excessive consumption of the privacy budget, we proposed the OBA mechanism to add a suitable amount of noise to the approximate histogram that will be published, which can achieve the privacy protection strength requirement. In conclusion, compared with the privacy protection algorithms that already exist in real-time data streams, the EOHP algorithm not only avoids privacy leakage by an untrusted third party, but also greatly improves data processing efficiency and achieves better data utility.

In future work, we will study personalized privacy budget allocation algorithms for privacy protection requirements for the data. In addition, we will study multi-dimensional datasets and consider more factors, such as data relevance, dimension importance, and privacy sensitivity, to design more reasonable and effective multi-dimensional data release protection algorithms.

## Contributors

Xiujun WANG and Tao TAO designed the research. Funan ZHANG processed the data. Tao TAO, Funan ZHANG, and Xiujun WANG drafted the paper. Xiao ZHENG and Xin ZHAO helped organize the paper, process the images, and verify the results in Sections 3 and 4. Funan ZHANG and Xiujun WANG revised and finalized the paper.

## Conflict of interest

All the authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

## Data availability

The data that support the findings of this study are

available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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